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ABSTRACT 
The main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are 
equity (internally generated cash), trade credit paid on time, long and short term 
bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs 
of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information (cost of 
gathering and analysing information) and transactions costs associated with non-
payment (costs of collecting and selling collateral). According to the Pecking 
Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case 
of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs 
across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is 
obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source 
is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In 
this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal 
costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet 
primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical 
analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition 
of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used 
and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are 
rejected. 
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Introduction 
 What determines the capital structure of a firm? The academic literature has presently 
two theories: the Pecking Order Theory and the Static Trade-off theory. In the Pecking Order 
Theory, firms choose the cheapest funding source first and when exhausted move to the 
second one etc until they end up with external equity. The difference in costs between the 
funding sources, besides risk, is due to asymmetric information and adverse selection. The 
second theory is the static trade-off theory, which, in most cases, is used to explain the choice 
between debt and equity, but it also applies to the composition of debt. In this theory, firms 
choose financing such that marginal costs of the funding sources are equal and in equilibrium, 
an additional Euro of activity (investment, increase in working capital etc) is financed by an 
equal amount (at least for very small increments in activity) of each financing source. In the 
Pecking Order Theory it is irrelevant what an additional Euro of financing is being used for 
all that matters is the adverse selection costs associated with each funding source. In the Static 
Trade off theory an additional Euro of required financing is raised from all the financing 
sources independently of its use. In this paper, we argue that due to asymmetric information 
and the solution to this problem for different providers of funding (primarily banks and other 
firms in the form of Trade credits) the marginal costs of each funding source are a function of 
the use of the funds. Thus, the composition of the asset side or the intended use of funds 
determines the source of the funds and more generally the capital structure; in particular 
purchases of Goods and Services is financed by Trade Credits, investments in fixed assets by 
Long Term Bank Loans and Debtors and other parts of Working Capital by Short Term Bank 
Loans. The theory is tested using (unbalanced) panel data set of Portuguese firms. Why 
Portuguese firms? The first reason is that the Portuguese financial system is not as developed 
as in for example the US and we would therefore ceteris paribus expect that problems 
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associated with asymmetric information are acerbated in the Portuguese system. The second 
reason is that we have access to a unique and detailed panel dataset of Portuguese SME’s. 
 
 We find that the composition of the asset side is an important determinant of the type 
of financing used by SME’s, or to put in another way the marginal costs of the financing 
source is a function of the use of funds. The Pecking Order Theory is therefore, rejected. It is 
a question of interpretation whether the Static trade off theory is rejected or not. What is 
rejected is that in equilibrium an additional Euro of spending is financed by all the different 
types of debt independently of it’s use, i.e. the marginal costs of funding depends on the use 
of the additional funds. This dependence is referred to as the Asset Side Theory, and is in 
contrast to the traditional Static Trade-off theory which holds that the marginal costs are equal 
and all funds used to finance an additional Euro of spending. The main difference between the 
two is the shape of the marginal costs curves, as to whether this qualifies as a new theory or is 
it part of the Static Trade-off Theory is a question of preference, below we have used the term 
Asset Side Theory to distinguish the two views for the purpose of clarification. 
 
 For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade 
credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources 
which  is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and 
the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise 
from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the 
non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since 
SMEs’ management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally 
generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest 
source.  
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 From ongoing business transactions and knowledge of the industry providers of trade 
credit had good information about the firm and the costs of solving the asymmetric 
information problem is relatively low. In case of non-payment, providers of trade credit are 
able to collect and sell the “collateral” (i.e. goods sold by them) depending on the type of 
goods at relatively low costs. Since the comparative advantage of providers of trade credits is 
in terms of gathering information and selling the goods (collateral) provided by them the 
amount of trade credit is also limited to the amount of goods and services delivered. The 
length of the credit period is a function of the nature of the goods and services sold. We 
expect very short periods for services and perishable goods since they have virtually no values 
as collateral, whereas raw materials may retain their value as collateral for longer periods and 
the suppliers are therefore willing to extend trade credit over longer periods as well. The 
primary determinant of the amount of trade credits is therefore the financial health of the firm 
and value of the types of goods and services sold as collateral. Although trade credits paid on 
time may be the cheapest source of external funds the firm is not able, in general, to finance 
all their activities using trade credits since the amount of available credit is restricted by the 
amount of goods and services delivered. 
 
 Banks have less information than the providers of trade credit and the cost of gathering 
information is higher than for providers of trade credit. In addition, the costs to banks of 
solving the asymmetric information problem may be higher for high growth firms etc. 
Providers of trade credit have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have 
themselves have manufactured and delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions, 
banks have an advantage in selling “general collateral” such as buildings, machinery etc. Thus 
banks have an advantage over providers of trade credits in issuing loans secured by “general 
collateral” such as long term bank loans. In the case of long-term bank loans, we expect the 
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value of loans is limited by the value of tangible assets as well as the variables representing 
the financial health of the firm.  
 
Short-term bank credit is related to Working Capital. In particular, banks have comparative 
advantages in evaluating and to a certain extent collection of accounts receivables. Banks 
have to access the credit worthiness of the firm applying for the loans as well as the 
creditworthiness of the firms in the accounts receivables portfolio. Cash and cash equivalents, 
ie, the firm’s liquidity, can also be used as collateral for Short Term Bank Loans, but the bank 
has no advantages in evaluating or using inventories as collateral. Thus, the key variable in 
explaining Short Term Bank Loans is Debtors (accounts receivables). 
 
 In the discussion, so far agency costs have not been mentioned. As discussed in 
Bartholdy and Mateus [2007] bank financing is a good way of solving these problems: Bank 
Loans may have a long maturity but the rates can be renegotiated e.g. every quarter and banks 
also can call in the loan. If a firm attempts to exploit the debt holders then banks have the 
possibility of imposing the “penalty” right away, which discourages these attempts. In an 
empirical analysis of the capital structure then the agency variables will not be significant for 
bank-financed firms.  
 
 Other categories of debt credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank loans. 
Once again, the variables determining this type of debt are financial health and performance. 
In the present study we have no idea what is included in this category and we suspect that it 
includes different types of debt for different firms. 
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 The last financing source is trade credit where payments if payment is delayed the firm 
will forego the discount and if the time is long enough penalty payment making this type 
financing rather expensive.  
 
 Asymmetric information therefore gives rise to costs associated with the provision of 
funds. It appears that equity has the lowest asymmetric financing costs, followed by bank 
credit, overdrawn trade credits and other debt. Although there are cost differences generated 
by asymmetric information, we do not have a Pecking Order financing structure since firms 
cannot choose between financing sources independently of the asset side of the balance sheet.  
 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the data for the 
study and Section 2 develops a theory of Pecking Order theory for SME’s. Section 3 tests the 
theory and Section 4 concludes the study. 
 
 
1. Financing of SME’s in Portugal and data description 
 The primary data source for this study is the Bank of Portugal Statistical Departments 
database. This database contains balance sheet and income statement data on 1,811 non-listed 
firms with 11,359 non-continuous firm year observations. Several selection criteria were 
impose for inclusion in the sample: Only manufacturing firms for the period 1990-1999 with 
more than 100 employees with data for at least one year were included. Firms with negative 
net worth and less than three years continuous data are not included in the sample. Firms with 
observations lying at the tails of the distribution are deleted from the sample, that is, if the 
firm has observations in either tail (0,5%) of the distribution. The final sample consists of 
1416 firms and 7546 firm year observations. 271 firms have data for the entire sample and 
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about 200 firms have data for 1 or two years only. Around 100 firms have data from 4 to 9 
years. Thus the dataset is an unbalanced panel sample data with an overweighted with firms 
which have only a few years of observations and firms with data for the entire period. 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 1 here] 
[PLEASE insert Table 2 here] 
 
 From Table 2 the number of observations is well distributed among the years with 
between 700 and 800 observations for each year. Surprisingly, the years with fewer 
observations are 1991, 1993 and 2000.  Looking at the distribution of observations across the 
industries “Textiles and clothes” industry contributes most with a third of the total 
observations. The “Heavy industry” and “Wood and paper paste” are the smallest with about 
15% each of the observations. The sample is in general representative for the Portuguese 
economy as a whole. 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 3 here] 
 
 Looking at the average size balance sheet in Table 3 Portuguese firms have close to 
50% equity whereas Rajan and Zingales [1995] report that large listed firms in the G7 
countries have equity ranging from 28% (Germany) to 42% (UK). However, Berger and 
Udell [1998] reports equity levels at around 50% for a sample of US SME’s. Thus it appears 
that Portuguese firms are financed in the same manner with respect to the choice of debt and 
equity as the smaller and medium sized US firms even though the Portuguese economy is 
significantly less developed than the US as represented by the importance of the “Textile and 
clothes” industry to the Portuguese economy. 
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The amount of current liabilities in Portugal ranges from 33% to 40%, whereas for the G7 
countries it ranges from 23% for Canada to 43.2% for Italy and 43%.4 (66%) for France. 
Thus Portugal has slightly more current liabilities than the average G7 country (treating 
France as an outlier). The composition of the current liabilities is dominated by bank loans 
(between 8% and 13%) and trade credits (between 8% and 14%) and other liabilities around 
10%.  Banks also dominates the long term debt where they account for between 9 and 13%. 
Thus overall banks or financial institutions accounts for around 20 to 25% of the financing in 
terms of loans. This is in line with US SME’s where banks account for around 25% of the 
financing (Berger and Udell [1998], Table1). The use of trade credits in the US is around 15% 
thus slightly higher than in Portugal. This is surprising since a priori one would expect that in 
countries with well developed financial institutions firms make less use of trade credits, i.e. 
firms leave the intermediary business to the financial institutions instead of acting as banks 
themselves. However, there is a category called “Other Current Liabilities” accounting for 
10% of the financing in Portugal and it may be that this type of financing is classified as 
“Trade credits” in Berger and Udell [1998]. Thus it is not possible on the current data to 
explore if this difference is a significant difference representing economic fundamentals or 
just a difference in classification. UK data for trade credits of SME’s is also in line with 
Portugal and the US at around 11% (Poutziouris et al. [2005]). It therefore appears as if 
SME’s in Portugal are financed in more or less the same way as in the US, but differently to 
large listed firms in the G7. 
 Finally on the liability side there is also an item called “Accrued Expenses” this item 
contains items that should be recognized this year but they are expenses and will only occur 
next year, these include (vacation subsidies, social expenses, rent, etc.). 
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The difference in financing structure between SME’s in general and large listed firms in the 
G7 may be driven by differences in asymmetric information. Small firms are in general more 
informational opaque than larger firms and larger firms therefore have easier access to 
financial markets and therefore rely less on banks and trade credits for financing.  
 
Estimating trade credits 
 From Table 3 it is clear that the main source of financing are trade credits, bank 
financing and “other financing”.  But the definition of trade credits is not clear. To the 
borrower the price of trade-credit depends on the terms of the “loan”. A standard textbook 
trade-credit contract is typically quoted as 2-10 net 30. This means, that the contract has a 
discount rate of 2% if the customer pays the bill within 10 days. Otherwise the full amount is 
due in 30 days. The contracts in Portugal differ from the standard textbook contract by not 
having the initial ten days thus a Portuguese contract is quoted as e.g. net 30 and the customer 
will receive the discount if the bill is paid within the 30 days1. Often the contract also contains 
a penalty rate if the payment is made after 30 days. According to Eurofactor [2006] the 
average payment terms for Portugal were 53 days in 2003, and the average late payment was 
45 days. 88% of the companies in Portugal starts the debt recovery process after on average 
42 days thus it appears that the threat of starting debt recovery has an impact since the average 
late payments is just below the average start of the debt recovery process2. 
 
 Portugal has three types of trade credit, the first is trade credit with a discount, and all 
firms will take this one, since financing is free3. The second type of trade credit is financing 
during the “second period” from the end of the discount period to the date where the firm 
                                               
1 Evidence from a “non-scientific” phone survey to randomly selected firms in each industry. 
2 It is not possible to obtain survey evidence for the sample period 1990-2000, thus we have to rely on later 
periods for “validation” of the method used. 
3 It is possible that some firms obtain a cheaper price by foregoing the discount and pay at the delivery of the 
goods. Approximately 1% of the firms in the sample does not have any trade credits and may be affected by this. 
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starts legal proceedings to recover the payment. The financing during this period is expensive 
since the company foregoes the discount and there may be a penalty attached as well. Again 
from Eurofactor [2006] in 2005 22% of Portuguese companies imposed late payment charges 
and out of these 93% of the firms collects them. The last type of trade credit is during the 
third period when the supplier starts legal proceedings and trade-credit financing at this stage 
becomes very expensive both in terms of direct costs such as forgone discounts, late payment 
charges and lawyers fees, but also in terms of lost reputation and the lack of ability to obtain 
future trade-credit financing. In this paper the last two periods has been collapsed into one 
since it is not possible to obtain an estimate of when the companies proceed with legal 
proceedings.  
 
 The definitions of cheap and expensive trade credits are straight forward, if the 
number of credit days is larger than specified in the contract then the trade credits are 
expensive and if the number of credit days is below then they are classified as cheap trade 
credits. Unfortunately, it is not possible from the balance sheet to ascertain what type of trade 
credits the firms use nor do we have any information on the Trade Credit Terms. Thus we 
need to obtain two estimates, one for the number of credit days and one for the number of 
days specified in the contract to classify firm’s trade credits as either cheap or expensive. 
 
 An estimate of the number of credit days can be obtained from the balance sheet and 
income statement as: 
 
( )
( ) 365/statement income Sold Goods ofCost 
sheet balance Credits-Trade ofAmount   days Credit =  
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 Notice that the amount of trade credits comes from the balance sheet and is therefore 
measured at a point in time, i.e. the end of the fiscal year whereas cost of goods sold is a flow 
measure representing the costs over the previous time period, usually one year. The number of 
credit days is therefore a point estimate based on the amount of trade credits at the end of the 
fiscal year, and this number may, or may not, be a good estimate of the average amount of 
trade credits throughout the year. If there is seasonality in the purchase of goods and services 
then the estimate will be a function of the precise time of measurement. Consider an extreme 
example of a toy store that always pay at the due date of say 90 days and stock for the 
Christmas trade in November. If the fiscal year date is end of November then the amount of 
trade-credits is very large and the estimate of credit days will be correspondingly large 
whereas if the fiscal year end is the end of February then the estimate of trade credits will be 
very small. Even in a sample where all firms pay at the due date the point estimate will show 
significant variation due to random or seasonal variation in the amount of trade credits 
measured at the point in time. 
 
 The second estimate we need is of the standard contract terms in the industry. At our 
disposal is a point estimate of the actual credit days at the end of the fiscal year for each 
company.  There are two factors influencing the number of actual credit days. The first is 
seasonality as discussed above. If the firm pays on time then our point estimate will fluctuate 
randomly around the number of days specified in the contract (a normal or symmetric 
distribution). This suggests using the average number of actual credit days for each industry 
as an estimate of the normal contract for the industry. However, the sample also includes 
firms that delay payments on the trade credit. The existence of firms with late payments 
influences that right hand side of the distribution and makes the distribution look like a log-
normal distribution. The mean and median number of days in the sample is therefore 
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influenced by the number of firms in the sample that delays payment and cannot be used as an 
estimate of the terms of the contract4. Instead we assume that most firms choose to pay on 
time, i.e. at the end of the contract and claim the discount, thus we use the most common 
number of actual credit days as an estimate of the number of credit days written into the 
contract for a given industry. The next problem relates to the seasonality and randomness of 
the estimate of actual credit days. As shown in the Toy store example above, the number of 
credit days estimated from the balance sheet may be above the number of days specified in 
the contract even though the firm pays on time. Thus the influence of seasonality and 
randomness needs to be removed to isolate the firms with late trade credit payments. Since the 
right hand of the distribution is influenced by the number of firms with late payment it is not 
possible to use the entire distribution to estimate the variance of the number of actual credit 
days for firms that pay on time. But it is possible to use the left hand side since the late 
payment firms will not be found here. Thus the semi-variance is estimated using the left hand 
side and converted to the variance for the distribution by multiplying by 2: 
 
 2 (0;
T
2
t
Min actual credit  days-contract days)
T
s
-
-
æ ö
= ç ÷
è ø
å  
 
 It is now possible to estimate cheap and expensive trade credit for each firm in the 
sample: 


if  actual credit days >contract credit days+1.96  Trade credit = expensive credit
if  actual credit days <contract credit days+1.96  Trade credit = cheap credit
s
s
Þ
Þ
 
 The average number of actual credit days for each industry is displayed in Figures 1 to 
7. In Figure 1 the distribution of the number of credit days is shown for the entire sample. The 
                                               
4 If one is willing to assume a log-normal distribution then it is possible to obtain an estimate of the first moment 
of the distribution from the average. However, here we choose to use a simpler method that does not rely on the 
properties of the distribuition. 
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median number of days is 92. The average number of days is 106 and is larger than the 
median reflecting that the distribution is skewed to the right due to late payments. Eurofactor 
[2006] reports an average number of credit days of 83 days for 2005, thus the number of 
credit days has declined over time.  A priori we would expect most firms to exploit the 
discount and pay on time, thus an estimate of the due date can be obtained by looking at the 
most common number of credit days (the tallest column in the figure).  For the entire sample 
this is between 75 and 85 days. In 2005, Eurofactor [2006] reports an average number of 
credit days from contracts of 53, thus there has been a decrease in actual and contract credit 
days over time.  
 
[PLEASE insert Table 4 here] 
 
 Figure 1 covers the entire sample and may therefore mask differences across 
industries. Figure 2-7 shows the distribution for the six industries. As expected the 
distribution of actual credit days is skewed to the right driven by the number of late paying 
firms. The estimate for the contract days for each industry is based on the most common 
number (largest column in the figures) rounded to an even number (30,40,..)5. The standard 
deviation ranges from 13 to 52 days. The cut-off days for cheap credit, i.e. if the number of 
credit days is larger than this number of days then the trade credit are defined as being 
expensive credits, is estimated as 1.96 times the estimate for the standard deviation plus the 
estimated value of the contract values (most common value). In table 4 the values ranges from 
66 days to 212 days.  
[PLEASE insert Table 5 here] 
                                               
5 NG, Smith and Smith [1999] reports that the normal contract issued by listed firms (Compustat firms) in the 
US is 2/10 net 30, that is a 2% discount is received if paid within 10 days otherwise payment has to be made 
within 30 days. 
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 An estimate of the amount of cheap trade-credit is then obtained by comparing the 
actual credit days with the estimated days for the industry. If the actual number of credit days 
is below the estimated days for the industry then all of the trade-credits is classified as cheap-
trade credit, i.e. the firm pays on or before the due date and claims the discount. If the actual 
number of days is above the estimated industry norm then all the trade-credits are classified as 
expensive, i.e. the firm pays after the due date and may have to pay a penalty and does not 
obtain the discount. From Table 5 there is a large variation in the use of expensive trade 
credits across industries. In the Machinery and equipment industry only 8% of the firms 
makes use of expensive credits whereas for Food and Drink and Heavy Machinery about 47% 
of the firms makes use of expensive credits. Howorth and Reber [2003] report results from a 
survey that for the UK 57% of SME’s occasionally pay their creditors late, thus it appears that 
the estimates for Portugal in Table 5 are below those for the UK but more importantly our 
estimation procedure does not produce numbers out of line with survey evidence6. 
 
 
2. Asset side theory of SME financing 
 In the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using 
internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive 
trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of 
financing are discussed.  
                                               
6 NG, Smith and Smith [1999] reports that about 30% of US firms do not claim the discount offered by listed 
firms (Compustat firms). 
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2.1. Cheap Trade credits 
 The first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are 
interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in 
competition with financial intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the 
role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in 
relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to 
financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially 
constrained firms (Bernanke and Blinder [1988]). The more recent research breaks the role of 
trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits7. 
 
Strategic motives 
 The first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. 
Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality 
before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that 
they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then 
these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of 
trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore 
more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or 
the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality. 
 
 The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the 
same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales 
without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between 
different buyers. Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of 
                                               
7 For a more general and broader discussion of trade credits see Smith [1987] and Petersen and Rajan [1997]. 
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alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits 
can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are 
offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing. 
 
 Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and 
the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the 
buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have 
better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has 
temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.  
 
 The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. 
Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to 
separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck driver delivering the goods 
does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also 
saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on “hand”. 
 
Financing motives 
 The basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering 
credit to other firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to 
firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have 
advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium 
sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage 
over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the 
payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of 
the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm. 
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 But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in 
solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in 
this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have 
advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the 
borrower and more frequently visits the premises than a financial institution does. The size 
and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions 
of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is 
available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow 
associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an 
indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the 
information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be able to obtain 
information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution. 
 
 The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at 
least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a 
powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only 
accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can 
seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing 
the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and 
at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of 
course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed 
them. 
If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then 
firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional 
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credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the 
bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm. 
 
 That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the 
amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance 
the entire operations of the firm. 
 
 In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low 
between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge 
of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of 
trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are 
secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the 
delivery value of the goods and services. 
 
2.2 Bank loans 
Banks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering 
information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade 
credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves 
delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling 
general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using 
tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue 
loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing 
to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical 
work below tangible assets and credit risk/bankruptcy variables are expected to explain the 
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use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value 
of tangible assets. 
 
 The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks 
have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to 
use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative 
advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since 
they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not 
have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors 
to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans. 
 
2.3. Expensive trade credit and other loans 
 After other sources of finance have been exhausted firms can delay payment on their 
trade credits. However, this is expensive since it involves giving up the discount and maybe 
incurs penalty payments. Also the use of this type of credit can have reputational costs and it 
may be difficult to obtain trade credit in the future. The nature of the costs, of course, depends 
on the number of suppliers, if there is only one supplier then these costs can be rather high 
whereas if the firm can obtain the same goods and services from other suppliers then these 
costs are not particularly high. 
 
 Other debt is composed of credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank 
loans. Again, the variables determining this type of debt are financial health and performance. 
Below, however, we do not have any good information regarding these types of loans and 
what they consists of thus we pay little attention to them in the empirical work8.  
                                               
8 This, of cause, is not desirable but we have been unable to obtain additional information from the data provider. 
We have also contacted several accountants labelled them a “catch all term”. 
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3. Empirical evidence 
 The key components of the asset side theory of SME financing presented above are 
whether the costs of asymmetric information and costs of collecting and selling collateral are 
important factors in the use of the different types of debt. The first set of tests below is 
therefore to establish whether the variables identified above (Cost of Goods Sold for Trade 
Credits, Tangible assets for Long Term bank Loans and Accounts Receivables for Short Term 
Bank Loans) are able to explain the choice of financing. As argued above each of these 
financing choices has different costs, as is the case for the Pecking Order Theory, but the 
Asset Side Theory does not lead to Pecking Order financing since firms cannot choose the 
financing independently of the asset side of the balance sheet. Thus, the next test is to test the 
theory against Pecking Order financing behavior. A modified version of the tests used by 
Shyam-Sunder and Meyers [1999] is used to test the two theories against each other. Finally, 
a simple test is used to test the asset side financing theory against the Static Tradeoff Theory. 
The Static Tradeoff Theory predicts that firms use different financing sources such that the 
marginal costs of obtaining an additional dollar in financing is equal for the different 
financing sources, or an additional dollar of financing is obtained in equals amount from each 
financing source. 
 
3.1. Testing the Asset side financing theory 
 It was argued above that the value of supplies bought was the key determinant of the 
use of trade-credits and firms will use these instead of short term bank financing since trade-
credits are cheaper due to the informational advantages held by the supplier of trade-credits 
over banks. The proxy used to capture this is the Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) divided by total 
assets: 
 
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.softwarelabs.com
 21 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
1
a b b b b b
b b b b g e
-
= + + + + + +
+ + + + +
æ ö
ç ÷
è ø
æ ö
ç ÷
è ø
Cheap Trade credit
it it it it it
it
Cheap Trade  credit
it it it it it
it
D
Intan Profit Size Business risk Growth
TA
D
Age Marginaltax Cogs Interest   (1)
TA
 
 
TA is total assets and INTAN is the amount of intangible assets, both obtained from the 
balance sheet of the firm. Age is the logarithm of the number of years since the start of the 
firm and size is the logarithm of total assets. GROWTH is measured as an average of the 
growth in total assets and growth in sales. PROFIT is earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by total assets and TAX is the marginal tax rate as developed by Graham ([1998], 
[2000])9. Finally, BUSINESS RISK is the standard deviation of return on assets and 
INTEREST is rate of interest. 
 
 Growth, Age, Intangible assets and Size are often interpreted as representing proxies 
for asymmetric information. Young, small and growing firms are often viewed as the most 
opaque firms.  Profit and Business risk are proxies for bankruptcy risk.  
 
 As discussed below there is an equation for each type of debt, since it is likely that  
errors are correlated across equations, i.e. shocks are common to all types of financing we use 
a Seemingly Unrelated Regression framework. Also, since the lagged dependent variable will 
be correlated with the error term in case of auto-correlation an Instrumental Variable approach 
is used, thus the estimation procedure is equivalent to Three Stage Least Squares. 
 
 Table 6 presents the results from estimating (1). For cheap trade credits the only 
significant variable, beside the lagged dependent variable, is Cost of Goods Sold. This 
                                               
9 See Bartholdy and Mateus [2007] for a discussion of the calculation of the marginal tax rate applicable for this 
sample. 
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supports the discussion above that there is very little asymmetric information associated with 
trade credits. The Age of the firm is significant at the six percent level thus there is weak 
support that younger firms uses slightly more trade credits compared with older firms. The 
results for Cheap trade Credits therefore supports The Asset Side Theory. 
 
 In the case of Long Term Bank Loans we argued above that the key variable is 
Tangible assets since the firm could pledge these as collateral for Long Term Bank Loans. 
The model is therefore given by: 
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Tan is Tangible assets divided by total assets. From Table 6 Tan is positive and significant 
thus supporting the Asset side theory. Intangible assets and size of the firms are also positive 
and significant; that size is positive significant and age negative and (nearly) significant is not 
surprising. Banks has comparative advantages in solving the asymmetric information problem 
and providing funding to existing customers, that is, older and larger firms. Young, small 
firms and high growth firms are often associated with asymmetric information thus banks are 
less willing to lend long term to these firms. But Intangible assets are also positive which is a 
surprise since the common belief is Intangible assets is a proxy for asymmetric information 
and should therefore have a negative coefficient. To the extend that Goodwill from 
Acquisitions dominates this term a positive coefficient may imply that Long Term Bank 
Loans are one of the financing sources for these transactions. Finally, Business risk is 
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negative and significant which fits with our intuition that banks are not willing to lend long 
term to more risky customers.  
 
Above we argued that short term debt is supported by (accounts receivables) and the 
profitability of the firm. The model is therefore given by: 
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Debtors are account receivables divided by total assets. Again from Table 6, Debtors is 
positive and significant supporting the discussion above. However, profitability is negative 
and (strongly) significant which does not support our theory. One possible explanation for this 
is that Short Term Bank Loans are provided to help firms with liquidity problems associated 
with a poor profitability in one year. Tax is positive thus it appears that firms increase Short 
Term Debt to take advantage of the tax shield associated with debt. Profitability is only 
significant for Short Term Bank Loans and this casts doubt on the conventional interpretation 
of the variable in empirical studies, namely a variable supporting the Pecking Order Theory 
and therefore a proxy for asymmetric information. If this was the case then it would have 
been significantly negative for all types of financing. 
 
As discussed in the data section we have no idea what Other Debt consists of and we 
therefore include all the variables in an explorative attempt at finding some significant 
factors: 
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As seen from Table 6 we none of the variables are significant and we have not explanation for 
this. 
 
 Expensive trade credits are probably the funding of last resort (perhaps together with 
other debt); they are relatively easy to obtain by lack of payment at the due date of the trade 
credits. However, the amount is limited by the availability of trade credits. The model used is 
the same as for Other Loans. From Table 6 we can see that Debtors is strongly significant 
indicating that firms will use expensive trade credits to finance their own, probably overdue, 
debtors to the extent that they cannot obtain short term financing from the bank. It also 
appears that large and young firms makes use of expensive trade credits; young firms 
probably because they have exhausted the other types of financing and they are often 
dependents of a few customers and if one of these customers due do not pay on time they are 
forced to use expensive trade credits. The motivation behind larger firms is different; here it is 
more likely that they are using their market power towards smaller suppliers. A small firm 
supplying a large firm cannot do much if a larger firm does not pay on time since they have 
the credible treat of using other suppliers, thus it is not likely that the smaller firm is going to 
impose penalties etc if a large firm does not pay on time. Thus expensive trade credits may 
not be that expensive for larger firms! 
 
 Overall Table 6 supports the theory that asymmetric information and the asset side of 
the balance sheet is one of the drivers of the financing choice of SMEs.  
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 Since the different financing sources may have different funding costs due differences 
in solving the asymmetric information problem it would be optimal for the firm to use the 
cheapest source first and then so forth, i.e. a Pecking Order Financing driven by the relative 
costs. However, the asset side theory puts restrictions on the choice of financing by the assets 
used as collateral for the debt, i.e. the firm is not free to choose the type of financing; the 
choice of asset determines the financing source. In the next section we use the framework 
developed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) to test the Pecking Order Theory and to test 
whether firms follow a pecking order in financing choice or the whether the financing source 
is determined by the asset side of the balance sheet. 
 
3.2. Test of Pecking Order behavior 
 The test used below is an adaptation of the test used by Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
[1999] and is given by: 
D Dit = a + bPO DEFit + eit   (5) 
 
where, Shyam-Sunder and Myers [1999] define DEF: 
 
DEFt = DIVt + Xt + DWt + Rt – Ct  (6) 
 
Where, Ct is operating cash flows after interest and taxes, DIVt is dividend payments, Xt is 
capital expenditures, DWt is the net increase in working capital, and Rt is the current 
proportion of long term debt at start of period.  DDit is the amount of debt issued (or retired). 
The pecking order hypothesis predicts that bPO = 1 and a = 0, that is internal generated funds 
are used first and if additional financing is required it is obtained using debt. Shyam-Sunder 
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and Myers [1999] find that the coefficient on deficit is statistically close to one. They do not 
include equity in equation (6) because the pecking order model will issue or retire equity only 
as a last resort which is a rare occurrence, a claim disputed by Frank and Goyal [2003] and 
Fama and French [2005]. However, Chirinko and Singha [2000] question the interpretation of 
this test. In particular they show that if firms issue external equity then the test performed by 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers [1999]. 
 
 Chirinko and Singha [2000] point out that equation (5) is only correctly specified if the 
firms indeed do not issue external equity, if they do then this will bias both the slope 
coefficient and the intercept term. The argument is clear from Figure 1. The first 80% of the 
firm issue one dollar debt for each dollar of deficit financing represented by the 45 degree line 
from O to A. The last 20% of the firms, having exhausted their ability to raise more debt, 
issue external equity represented by A to B on the horizontal line. If we estimate equation (5) 
on a dataset where e.g. 20% use external equity without accounting the for the kink then the 
slope of the estimated line becomes “an average” of a line with a slope of 1 and a line with a 
slope of zero and the estimated slope coefficient will therefore be below 1. 
DEF
Net Debt Issue
O
A B
 
Figure 1 
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From an econometric point of view the main problem is the location of the breakpoint since 
this has to be estimated. 
 
 The testing procedure below utilizes the idea derived from figure 1. Consider the case 
where the firm has three external funding sources L1, L2 and L3 and under the Pecking Order 
Hypothesis the financing pecking order is assumed to be L1, L2 and L3. For each of the 
funding sources there is a dollar for dollar relationship between the funding deficit and the 
funding source provided that the funding source is below the capacity for this type of funding, 
thus figure 1 holds for each funding source, i.e. there is a breakpoint and the slope coefficient 
is equal to one. 
 
The data is sorted by the funding deficit and the following regression is estimated: 
 
1
1, ,   (7)it i t itL Defa b e= + ´ +  
 
where, Def1 is  the funding deficit in relation to funding source 1 and defined as internal 
generated cash flows – investments –changes in working capital – changes in equity, where 
changes in working capital is defined as changes in (Debtors + Inventories + Cash and Cash 
Equivalents + Prepaid Expenses - Accrued Income). 
 
 Equation (7) is then tested for a breakpoint and if a breakpoint is found it is imposed 
on the regression as a dummy variable with a value of zero if the observation is below the 
breakpoint and one otherwise. The following regression is then estimated: 
 
1 1
1, , ,   (8)it b b i t a it a it i t itL Def D D Defa b a b e= + ´ + ´ + ´ ´ +  
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The prediction of the Pecking Order Theory is then given by: 
§ There exists a breakpoint and 
§ 1bb = , 0ab =  and 0ba =  
 
 The Asset Side Theory also predicts breaks since the assets used as collateral for loans 
restrict the amount of the financing available. The coefficients on DEF, therefore depends on 
how DEF is made up and the type of financing investigated. For example, if the major source 
of the funding deficit comes from an increase in investments, then we expect the coefficient 
on DEF in the equation for Cheap Trade Credits, Short Term Bank Loans to be zero and 
significant for the Long Term Bank financing equation. This feature of the asset side theory is 
further explored below, but first Pecking Order behaviour is tested. 
 
For L2 the following regression is estimated: 
 
2
2, ,   (9)it i t itL Defa b e= + ´ +  
 
Where, Def2 is defined as: Def1 – L1 and so forth for any subsequent funding sources. The 
equation is then tested for a breakpoint and if one is found the following is estimated: 
 
2 2
2, , ,   (10)it b b i t a it a it i t itL Def D D Defa b a b e= + ´ + ´ + ´ ´ +  
 
Andrews [1993] and Andrews and Ploberger [1994] are used to test for and estimate the break 
points for each equation. The assumed Pecking Order is: Cheap Trade Credits, Long Term 
Bank Loans, Short Term Bank Loans, Expensive Trade Credits and Other Loans. However, as 
we do not know what Other Loans consists of, it is not clear if the last two terms should be 
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changed around in the pecking order. Table 7 provides results from the break tests of each 
funding source, and these tests confirm the prediction by Pecking Order Financing that breaks 
exists. The next step is to test the predictions: 
§ 1bb =  and 0ab =  
 
The following system estimated by SUR is used to test the predictions: 
 
  
, ,
   
, ,
   
Cheap Trade Credits CTC CTC CTC CTC CTC CTC CTC CTC
it b b i t a it it a it it i t it
Long Term Bank Loans LTBL LTBL LTBL LTBL LTBL LTBL LTBL LTBL
it b b i t a it a it i t it
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L Def D D Def
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Loans STBL STBL STBL STBL STBL STBL STBL STBL
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Expensive Trade Credits ETC ETC ETC ETC ETC ETC ETC ETC
it b b i t a it it a it it i t it
Def D D Def
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a b a b e
a b a b e
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D is a dummy variable indentifying the estimated break in the sample from the tests in Table 
7. The null hypothesis is given by: 
 
1
0
0
CTC LTBL STBL ETC
b b b b
CTC LTBL STBL ETC
a a a a
CTC LTBL STBL ETC
b b b b
b b b b
b b b b
a a a a
= = = =
= = = =
= = = =
 
 
 As seen from Table 8 the predictions by the Pecking Order Theory are soundly 
rejected, but the predictions by the Asset Side Theory that the function should contain a break 
since the firm does not have unlimited funds of each category available is not rejected. 
 
 The predictions of the Asset Side Theory are that the financing instrument is a 
function of the underlying factor determining the funding deficit. Recall that the prediction for 
Cheap Trade Credits is that changes in these are generated by changes in the amount of goods 
and services delivered to the firm. Unfortunately, we do not have explicit data on this but it is 
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likely to be correlated with changes in Working Capital. We are more fortunate when it comes 
to changes in Long Term Bank Loans since the prediction is that these changes are driven by 
investments in fixed assets and we do have data for investments. Also, changes in Short Term 
Bank Loans are driven by changes in debtors and possibly other components of Working 
Capital. The definition of changes in Working Capital is therefore redefined to be net of 
changes in Debtors, below labeled by the superscript “n”.   Finally, expensive credits are used 
when everything else fails. Thus we can use the following model: 
 
1 2 3
1 2 3
Cheap Trade Credits CTC CTC CTC n CTC
it it it it it
Long  Term Bank  Loans LTBL LTB LTBL n LTBL
it it it it it
Short  Term 
it
L Investments Working  capital Debtors
L Investments Working capital Debtors
L
a b b b e
a b b b e
= + + D + D +
= + + D + D +
1 2 3
1 2 3
Bank  Loans STBL STB STBL n STBL
it it it it
Expensive Trade Credits ETC ETC ETC n ETC
it it it it it
Investments Working  capital Debtors
L Investments Working  capital Debtors
a b b b e
a b b b e
= + + D + D +
= + + D + D +
 
Recall that L is the change in the financing source and the predictions from the Asset Side 
Theory in it most extreme form are: 
· Changes in Cheap Trade Credits are driven by changes in the components of Working 
Capital: 1 2 30, 0, 0
CTC CTC CTCb b b= > =  
· Changes in Long Term Bank financing are driven by investments: 
1 2 30, 0, 0
LTBL LTBL LTBLb b b> = =  
· Short Term Bank Loans are driven by changes in Debtors and possible also in changes 
in Working Capital: 1 2 30, 0, 0
STBL STBL STBLb b b= > >  
 
We do not have explicit predictions for Expensive Trade Credits since these are presumably 
the last resort. Table 9 presents the results. As predicted investments in the equation for 
Cheap Trade Credits is not significant; firms do not use Cheap Trade Credits to finance fixed 
assets. Changes in Working Capital are significant as predicted, but changes in Debtors are 
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also significant which is not supported by the theory. There are at least three possible 
interpretations of this result. The first is that firms use the cheapest source first to finance an 
increase in debtors, a type of Pecking Order Financing. However this theory is rejected above. 
The second explanation is that growth will increase both Cheap Trade Credits and Debtors, 
generating a correlation but no causation between these two variables. Finally, all providers of 
credits may be satisfied by the collateral value of Accounts Receivables and therefore willing 
the lend to a firm with many Debtors, rejecting the above argument that banks have 
comparative advantages in evaluating Accounts Receivables. 
 In the case of Long Term Bank Loans investments is strongly significant and changes 
in Working Capital insignificant which supports the Asset Side Theory. It is also the case that 
changes in Debtors is significant suggesting that firms use Long Term Bank Loans to finance 
Accounts Receivables/debtors. Since changes is Debtors represents Trade Credits granted by 
the company which are short term in nature and it does not appear likely that Long Term 
Bank Loans are being used for their financing. We therefore revert to the same argument as 
for the Cheap Trade Credits that growth leads to an increase in Debtors as well as in 
investments and change in Debtors is therefore correlated with Changes in Long Term Bank 
Loans. 
 In the case of Short Term Bank Loans, the significance of investments rejects the 
Asset Side Theory, although the significance of changes in Working Capital and changes in 
Debtors supports the theory. Since Expensive Trade Credits is a last resort we expect all 
coefficients to be significant which is indeed the case. 
 
 Thus there is supporting and contradictory evidence for the Asset Side Theory. First 
the supporting evidence, there appears to be amble evidence that the composition of the asset 
side of the balance sheet has implications for the choice of financing, that firms cannot choose 
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financing independently of the asset side. The contradictory evidence from Cheap Trade 
Credits and Short Term Bank Loans, although it appears that the asset side of the balance 
sheet is again important, the theory as presented above does not provide an entirely adequate 
job of explaining the behavior of these loans. 
 
3.3. Static Trade-of Theory 
 An alternative explanation is that firms use the Static Trade-off Theory. In this theory 
firms  finance each additional Euro in funding deficit by increasing all the funding sources 
until the marginal costs are equal, thus and additional Euro required in funding will, in 
equilibrium, increase all funding sources by an equal amount. In terms of the above equation 
system, this corresponds to the following restrictions: 
 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
CTC CTC CTC LTB LTBL LTBL STB STBL STBLbb b b b b b b b= = = = = = = =  
 
These restrictions are strongly rejected. If there are transactions costs and firms therefore 
obtain one type of loan at a time then the cross equation restrictions would be rejected. But in 
the Static trade-off theory it does not matter what the source of the funding deficit is, and we 
therefore have the following set of restrictions under transactions costs (dropping the cross 
equation restrictions): 
 
2
2
2
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
, (2) = 2.3895  with Significance Level 0.3028
, (2) = 1331.03 with Significance Level 0.00000000
, (2) 57.0300 with Significance Level 0.000000
CTC CTC CTC
LTB LTBL LTBL
STB STBL STBL
b c
c
c
b b
b b b
b b b
= =
= =
= = = 00 
 
We do not reject the restictions for Cheap Trade Credits, however the Static Trade off theory 
is rejected for both Long- and Short-Term Bank Loans. 
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The overall picture from Tables 6 to 9 it is not entirely clear-cut, although it does appear that 
the Pecking Order Theory does not hold. There is some support for the Asset Side Theory, in 
particular that Long Term Bank Loans are driven by investments in fixed assets. There is also 
some support for the notion that Cheap Trade Credits are driven by goods and services 
delivered. Short Terms Bank loans, on the other hand, seems to be driven by all three factors 
namely, changes in working capital, changes in debtors and by investments. So it appears that 
the composition of the asset side of the balancesheet is an important determinant for Cheap 
Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans, and less so for Short Term Bank Loans and 
Expensive Trade Credits. In particular the evidence for Short Term Bank loans is mixed, 
changes in working capital and debtors are significant as expcted but investments also seems 
to be financed by Short Term Bank Loans and profitabilty has a negative influence on the 
amounts of Short Term Bank Loans. One possible interpretation of these results is the 
following. Firms financing fixed investments cannot borrow the full amount, since the 
collateral value of the asset is less than the purchase price and thus firms with low cash flows 
(low profitability) cannot cover the funding deficit from own funds and is therefore forced to 
use Short Term Bank Loans or Expensive Trade Credits to cover the gap.  
 As is common in the literature when faced with results that are not clear cut we 
conclude that there is definitely room for additional research in this area. 
 
 
Conclusions 
Currently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms 
first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so 
on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric 
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information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of 
debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are 
tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the expected bankruptcy 
costs and the “negative agency costs”.  In terms of the choice of financing, firms equate the 
marginal costs of each financing source and in equilibrium the marginal costs of each source 
are equal and therefore one additional Euro will be raised from all the financing types. In both 
of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in 
this paper, that proposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition 
of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the 
balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of 
the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available. 
 
 We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the 
relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works 
reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short 
Term Bank Loans are disappointing.  
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Table 1: Number of firms with consecutive data 
The sample is unbalanced since companies may have data for less than 10 years. The table 
shows the number of firms and the number of years for which they have consequitive data 
 
 
Years of data 
 
Number of firms 
1 196 
2 200 
3 149 
4 123 
5 108 
6 100 
7 90 
8 90 
9 89 
10 271 
Total 1416 
 
 
 
Table 2: Number of firm year observations across years and industries 
 
Industry 
Year 
Food and 
drinks 
Textiles 
and clothes 
Wood and 
paper paste 
Chemical 
products 
Heavy 
industry 
Machinery 
and 
equipment Total 
1991 102 236 56 125 53 127 699 
1992 114 278 61 119 49 139 760 
1993 107 272 63 121 48 128 739 
1994 105 274 59 120 50 133 741 
1995 109 274 67 130 51 137 768 
1996 108 270 71 130 51 134 764 
1997 106 272 70 132 56 128 764 
1998 113 282 67 133 63 140 798 
1999 111 277 70 133 61 138 790 
2000 97 232 59 133 65 137 723 
Total 1072 2667 643 1276 547 1341 7546 
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Table 3: Balance sheet  
Average Balance Sheets items as a Fraction of Total Assets  
 
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Assets       
Fixed Assets 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.50 0.51 0.47 
Intangible Assets    0.01    0.01    0.04    0.04    0.03    0.02 
Tangible Assets    0.43    0.42    0.40    0.37    0.39    0.34 
Investments    0.08    0.10     0.10    0.09    0.09    0.11 
Current Assets 0,48 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.52 
Stocks (Liquidity)    0.02    0.01    0.01    0.02    0.01    0.01 
Debtors    0.24    0.24    0.26    0.29    0.26    0.30 
Inventories    0.19    0.17    0.15    0.14    0.15    0.16 
Cash and cash   
    Equivalents 
   0.02    0.03    0.03    0.04    0.06    0.04 
Prepaid Expenses    0.01    0.02    0.01    0.01    0.01    0.01 
       
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Shareholders’s Funds 
and Liabilities 
      
Shareholders’s Funds 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.46 
Capital   0.22   0.21   0.25   0.25   0.24   0.20 
Reserves   0.23   0.25   0.19   0.21   0.22   0.21 
Net Income of the Year   0.04   0.01   0.02   0.02   0.03   0.05 
Provisions 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Liabilities 0.49 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.53 
Non-Current Liabilities   0.16   0.15   0.14   0.15   0.13   0.13 
Long-Term Debt     0.13     0.12      0.09     0.11     0.09     0.10 
Bank Loans       0.10       0.10       0.07       0.09       0.08       0.09 
Other       0.03       0.02       0.02       0.02       0.01       0.01 
Other Non-Current  
   Liabilities 
     0.03      0.03      0.05      0.04      0.04      0.03 
Current Liabilities   0.33   0.37   0.39     0.36   0.37   0.40 
Loans     0.10     0.13     0.12     0.08     0.08     0.09 
Bank Loans       0.10       0.13       0.12       0.08       0.08      0.09 
Others     <0.01     <0.01     <0.01     <0.01     <0.01     <0.00 
Creditors     0.10     0.10     0.12     0.12     0.12      0.14 
Other Current   
   Liabilities (Incl.   
   Shareholder’s) 
    0.09     0.09     0.09     0.09     0.10      0.10 
Accrued Expenses     0.04     0.05     0.06     0.07     0.07      0.07 
 
 
 
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.softwarelabs.com
 39 
Table 4: Summary of evidence for estimating Credit Days 
Sample data Industry 
Median 
number of 
days 
Most 
common 
number of 
days 
Estimate 
used in 
calculations 
Estimate of 
standard 
deviation of 
credit days 
Number of 
credit days 
with cheap 
credit 
Food and drinks 60 35-45 40 13.6098 66.6752 
Textiles and clothes 86 66-75 70 28.5422 125.9427 
Wood and paper 
paste 
95 85-95 90 34.5357 157.69 
Chemical products 116 85-95 90 28.8522 
 
146.5503 
Heavy machinery 108 75-85 80 18.6593 116.5722 
Machinery 
production and 
equipment 
106 105-115 110 52.1976 212.3073 
      
 
Table 5: Distribution of expensive trade credits 
 
Industry Number of 
firms 
Percentage of 
firms with 
expensive 
credit 
Expensive 
credits as 
percentage of 
total credit 
Food and drinks 818 47.066 63.576 
Textiles and clothes 1913 27.757 38.889 
Wood and paper paste 481 16.008 19.143 
Chemical products 956 33.682 32.869 
Heavy machinery 383 47.258 41.446 
Machinery production 
and equipment 
954 8.071 5.965 
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Table 6: Tests of the factors determining the use of different types of debt 
 
The dependent variable is cheap trade credits, long and short term bank loans, other debt and 
expensive trade credits divided by total assets. Trade credits are defined as cheap if the 
number of credit days (creditors/cost of gods sold/360) is less than the norm for the industry 
and as expensive if the number of credits days is greater than the norm. Intangible and 
tangible assets are obtained from the balance sheet and scaled by total assets. Profitability is 
earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets.  Size is the logarithm of total assets, 
growth is the average of the growth in total assets and sales. Business risk is the standard 
deviation of the return on assets, Age is the age of the company and Interest is the three 
month risk free rate of interest and the marginal tax rate (see Bartholdy and Mateuse [2007]). 
The regression is estimated using Instrumental variables in a Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(3SLS). Industry dummy variables are also included but not reported. T-statistics are reported 
below the coefficient. 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Variable 
Cheap trade 
credit 
Long term 
bankloans 
Short term 
bankloans Other credits 
Expensive 
trade credits 
Constant -0.0273 -0.0065 0.0054 0.0038 -0.0458 
 (-1.4036) -0.3762 0.2920 0.2780 -1.2290 
Lagged dependent variable 0.7238 0.82909 0.8592 1.0606 0.8277 
 (35.736) 61.8506 68.5762 7.5596 41.8729 
Intangible -0.0196 0.0646 -0.0025 0.0082 0.1031 
 (-0.7258) 2.4502 -0.0888 0.7424 2.1644 
Profitability  0.0056 -0.0062 -0.0191 0.0001 0.0040 
 (1.2327) -1.4218 -4.0749 0.0307 0.5205 
Size -0.0017 0.0073 0.0024 -0.0007 0.0118 
 (-0.5597) 2.8375 0.8362 -0.2956 2.2042 
Business risk -0.0026 -0.1234 -0.0433 0.0023 -0.0401 
 (-0.0870) -3.9809 -1.3065 0.1984 -0.7833 
Growth 0.0761 -0.0992 -0.0833 -0.0028 -0.3300 
 (1.3858) -2.5864 -1.9342 -0.1318 -3.5073 
Interest -0.0164 -0.0162 -0.0269 -0.0100 0.0301 
 (-0.6710) -0.6665 -1.0174 -0.7707 0.7171 
Age 0.0072 -0.0071 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0162 
 (1.8984) -1.9394 -0.3742 -0.8592 -2.5207 
Marginal tax rate 0.0139 -0.0206 0.0391 -0.0001 -0.0048 
 (0.8556) -1.2250 2.1773 -0.0022 -0.1717 
Cost of goods sold 0.0327   0.0003 0.0021 
 (7.7389)   0.2492 0.4335 
Tangible assets  0.0137  0.0011 0.0182 
  2.3015  0.4034 1.8140 
Debtors   0.0239 -0.0007 0.0784 
   3.0023 -0.2175 6.2603 
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Table 7: Tests for unknown breakpoints. 
 
Andrews [1993] and Andrews and Ploberger [1994] tests for unknown breakpoints are 
applied to the following model: 
, ,
j
j it i t itL Defa b e= + ´ +  
Where Lj,it is the change in financing source “j”, where j is Cheap Trade Credits, Long Term 
Bank Debt, Short Term bank Debt, Expensive Trade Credits and Other Debt. Def is the 
funding deficit defined as internal generated cash flows – investments –changes in working 
capital – changes in equity, where changes in working capital is defined as changes in 
(Debtors + Inventories + Cash and Cash Equivalents + Prepaid Expenses - Accrued Income). 
For Cheap Trade Credits DEF1 is defined as above, for Long Term Bank Loans Def2 is 
defined as Def1 minus changes in Cheap Trade Credits, Def3 for Short Term Bank Loans is 
defined as Def2 . Robust standard errors are used. P-values are from Hansen [1997].  
 
 
Type of tests 
 
Andrews [1993] 
 
Andrews and Ploberger [1994] 
 
 
 
 
Financing Source (L) Test value P-value 
 
Test value P-value 
Using entire sample 
 
Cheap Trade Credits 10.1621 0.0887 2.8844 0.0698 
Long Term Bank Loans 15.5555 0.0089 5.4605 0.0054 
Short Term Bank Loans 51.8251 0.0000 22.4051 0.0000 
Expensive Trade Credits 68.5175 0.0000 31.4621 0.0004 
Other Debt 66.4814 0.0000 30.4841 0.0002 
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Table 8: Tests of Pecking Order Theory 
 
The following model is estimated: 
  
, ,
   
, ,
   
Cheap Trade Credits CTC CTC CTC CTC CTC CTC CTC CTC
it b b i t a it it a it it i t it
Long Term Bank Loans LTBL LTBL LTBL LTBL LTBL LTBL LTBL LTBL
it b b i t a it a it i t it
Short Term Bank
it
L Def D D Def
L Def D D Def
L
a b a b e
a b a b e
= + ´ + ´ + ´ ´ +
= + ´ + ´ + ´ ´ +
, ,
  
, ,
Loans STBL STBL STBL STBL STBL STBL STBL STBL
b b i t a it a it i t it
Expensive Trade Credits ETC ETC ETC ETC ETC ETC ETC ETC
it b b i t a it it a it it i t it
Def D D Def
L Def D D Def
a b a b e
a b a b e
= + ´ + ´ + ´ ´ +
= + ´ + ´ + ´ ´ +
 
Where Ljit is the change in financing source “j”, where j is Cheap Trade Credits, Long Term 
Bank Debt, Short Term bank Debt, and Expensive Trade Credits. Def is the funding deficit 
defined as internal generated cash flows – investments –changes in working capital – changes 
in equity, where changes in working capital is defined as changes in (Debtors + Inventories + 
Cash and Cash Equivalents + Prepaid Expenses - Accrued Income). For Cheap Trade Credits 
DEFCTC is defined as above, for Long Term Bank Loans DefLTBL is defined as DefCTC minus 
changes in Cheap Trade Credits, DefSTBL for Short Term Bank Loans is defined as DefLTBL – 
Long Term Bank Loans. The system is estimated using SUR. T-statistics in parenthesis. 
 
Dependent variables (L) 
 D Cheap 
Trade Credits 
D Long Term 
Bank Loans 
D Short Term 
Bank Loans 
D Expensive 
Trade Credits 
Constant  before break jba   0.000462  -0.004856  -0.005510   -0.003395 
               (0.1254)    (-1.9091)       (-2.4243) (-1.9000) 
Constant after break jaa       0.003636     -0.006554     0.012079    0.006519 
 (3.0223)        (-4.3302)       (8.9514)       (3.8720) 
Def before break jbb  0.073172     0.097178      0.231143       0.196948 
             (3.3159)      (4.9452)      (13.1786)    (13.2273) 
Def after break jbb        0.031575       0.244804       0.111663      0.152862 
 (4.6328)       (31.6611)      (16.2133)      (17.9857)     
 
Tests of the predictions of the Pecking Order Theory: 
 
2
2
2
14852.7764 with Significance Level 0.00000000     
3024.2920 with Significance Level 0.00000000
1,  (4)=  
0,  (4)=
0,  (4)=
CTC LTBL STBL ETC
b b b b
CTC LTBL STBL ETC
a a a a
CTC LTBL STBL ETC
b b b b
b b b b c
b b b b c
a a a a c
= = = =
= = = =
= = = =
2
 19.8956 with Significance Level 0.0005
Joint test of all restrictions: 31498.5939 with Significance Level 0.00000000(12)=c
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Table 9: Testing for the driving factors in the change of financing sources. 
The following model is tested: 
1 2 3
1 2 3
Cheap Trade Credits CTC CTC CTC CTC
it it it it it
Long  Term Bank  Loans LTBL LTB LTBL LTBL
it it it it it
Short  Term Ba
it
L Investments Working capital Debtors
L Investments Working capital Debtors
L
a b b b e
a b b b e
= + + D + D +
= + + D + D +
1 2 3
1 2 3
nk  Loans STBL STB STBL STBL
it it it it
Expensive Trade Credits ETC ETC ETC ETC
it it it it it
Investments Working capital Debtors
L Investments Working capital Debtors
a b b b e
a b b b e
= + + D + D +
= + + D + D +
 
Where Ljit is the change in financing source “j”. Notice that changes in working capital is 
defined slightly different than in Table 8, change in working capital is defined as changes in  
(Inventories + Cash and Cash Equivalents + Prepaid Expenses - Accrued Income). The 
system is estimated using SUR. T-statistics in parenthesis. 
 
 Change in Finance Source (Li) 
 D Cheap 
Trade 
Credits 
D Long Term 
Bank Loans 
D Short Term 
Bank Loans 
D Expensive 
Trade Credits 
Constant term ia       0.0048 -0.0319 0.0072 0.0091 
 (2.1200) (-13.7032) (3.1732) (3.0982) 
 
D Investments 1
ib         
 
0.0131 
 
0.3603 
 
0.0740 
 
0.0470 
 (1.5425) (41.1893) (8.6924) (4.2560) 
 
D Working Capital  2
ib        
 
0.0139 
 
-0.0108 
 
0.0340 
 
0.0382 
 (2.2526) (-1.6931) (5.4610) (4.7332) 
 
D Debtors 3
ib        
 
0.0303 
 
0.0391 
 
0.0663 
 
0.1225 
 (3.4381) (4.2960) (7.4794) (10.6525) 
 
Tests of restrictions for Asset Side Story: 
2
1 3 2 3 1 0,   (5) 180.0668  with Significance Level 0.0000
CTC CTC LTBL LTBL STBLb b b b b c= = = = = =
T
ests of Static Trade-off Theory: 
2
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
(8) 1637.629095 with Significance Level 0.0000    
CTC CTC CTC LTB LTBL LTBL STB STBL STBLb
c
b b b b b b b b= = = = = = = =
=
 
 
Relax cross equation restrictions 
2
2
2
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
, (2) = 2.3895  with Significance Level 0.3028
, (2) = 1331.03 with Significance Level 0.00000000
, (2) 57.0300 with Significance Level 0.000000
CTC CTC CTC
LTB LTBL LTBL
STB STBL STBL
b c
c
c
b b
b b b
b b b
= =
= =
= = = 00 
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Figure 1 
Creditdays for entire sample
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Food and Drink
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Figure 3 
Textiles and clothes
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Figure 4 
Wood and paper paste
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Figure 5 
 
Chemical products
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Figure 6 
 
Heavy industry
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Figure 7 
Machinery production and equipment
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